### APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA ELKINS

WOODROW YOKUM,

Petitioner,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 79-0130-E(H)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

### MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Respondent moves this case be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this action Petitioner seeks an order for Respondent to show cause why certain property seized from him pursuant to valid search warrants should not be returned. It is Respondent's position that Petitioner is foreclosed from recovery of the property because the issue sought to be determined in this action has been previously adjudicated.

In 1967 Respondent obtained a series of search warrants to seize property allegedly stolen from the United States by the Petitioner. One group of search warrants, executed on February 10, 1967,

resulted in the recovery of a large variety of articles, including a utitlity truck, a dump truck, a 1962 sedan, two large military trailer vans, various items of electronic equipment, hundreds of electric typewriters and other electric office machines, musical instruments, two military assault boats, 967 pairs of unused binoculars, several guns, one pneumatic pavement breaker, numerous rubber burial bags, a closed circuit television system, and may other articles of varied descriptions. 1 An Army Reserve unit made available eight Army trucks and 24 Army personnel on February 12, 1967, to assist in removing and transporting the confiscated property to storage places.,

<sup>1</sup>See Petitioner's Exhibits A, 1 through 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See Government's Memorandum filed June 16, 1977, in <u>United States of America v. Woodrow Yokum, Fred L. Riggleman and Sherri L. Riggleman, Civil Action No. 76-0241-E(H), dismissed without prejudice by Order of this Court, filed March 23, 1979.</u>

Another search warrant issued on March 10, 1967, resulted in the seizure of property allegedly stolen from the United States. Some of the property was seized by notice and padlocked in a barn on Petitioner's farm.

Petitioner was convicted on ten counts of an eleven count indictment charging him with interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles; unlawful sale of property stolen from the United States; and transportation of property obtained by fraud from the United States. His conviction as to one of the ten counts was overturned on appeal. See United States v. Yokum, 417 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 907 (1970).

Petitioner sought return of the property seized upon which there was no related conviction or for which there was no forfeiture proceeding instituted by Respondent to effect transfer of title to

<sup>3&</sup>lt;u>See</u> Petitioners's Exhibits F, 1 through 3. (There may be a dispute as to the location of some of the seized property).

the United States. Petitioner's first attempt to recover the property was in conjunction with a request for a reduction of sentence. In that proceeding a Rule 41(e) motion, Federal Rules of Ciminal Procedure was denied without prejudice to file a civil action to recover the seized property.

Petitioner filed a complaint on July 12, 1973, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking either the reasonable value or the return of the seized property. The case was dismissed by

<sup>\*</sup>United States of America v. Woodrow Yokum, 67-91-E (N.D. W. Va., May 29, 1970). Judge Maxwell's written order states in pertinent part:

<sup>&</sup>quot;ORDERED that the defendant's Motion For Admission to Probation Or For Reduction of Sentence and Motion For Return Of Property and For Rental Of Property Seized be, and the same are hereby, overruled, and it is further

ORDERED that the Court's ruling on the defendant's Motion For The Return of Property and For Rental Of Property Seized, for reason appearing on the record, is made without prejudice to the defendant's right to prosecute a civil action for the Return Of The Property and For Rental Of Property Seized."

Memorandum Order filed September 13, 1974. 5 The dismissal was premised on

Moodrow Yokum v. United States of America and James Companion, etc., C.A. No. 73-105-E (N.D.W.Va.). The Court described the motion it granted as follows:

"Defendant United States of America has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Defendant Companion has also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the ground of quasi-judicial immunity."

Certainly the action would be res judicata as to Defendant Companion (not a party in the present action), or anyone else under Rule 19(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, who should have been joined in that action. Petitioner clearly had the option of appealing dismissal of his constitutional cliam against Defendant Companion. See Davis V. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S 478, 504 (1978); and Bivens v. Six Unknown Ped. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 396 (1971). But as to Defendant United States of America (Respondent in the present action), res judicata would not apply. In Hunter v. United States, 283 F. 2d 874 (Ct.Cl. 1960), the Court held that an action dismissed in a district court (because no jurisdiction could be asserted there over the Defendant United States) could properly be brought in the Court of Claims and rejected the contention that the subsequent action was barred by res judicata. Was a company of the compa

the immunity from suit of the Defendants. No appeal was taken from that dismissal.

On January 2, 1975, Petitioner sought damages under the Pifth Amendment in the United States Court of Claims, but was denied relief because the claim was barred as a matter of law by the statute of limitations. Also on January 2, 1975, an action was filed by Petitioner's daughter and son-in-law, Sherri and Fred Riggleman. This action was decided adversely to the Rigglemans by the United States Court of Claims by order dated September 29, 1977. No appeal was taken.

On October 22, 1976, Respondent petitioned this Court to order Woodrow

<sup>6</sup>Woodrow Yokum v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 972, 529 F.2d 532 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>A barn within which much of the seized property had been padlocked was on a farm transferred to Petitioner's daughter, subject ot a life estate retained by Wanda Yokum, by a deed dated December 23, 1968. The life estate was released on April 19, 1973. Fred L. Riggleman, et al v. United States, No. 3-75, Slip Op. at 2 (Ct.Cl., Sept. 29, 1977).

Yokum, Fred and Sherri Riggleman to show cause why they should not be ordered to allow the United States upon the Yokum-Riggleman property to remove the seized property. Respondent withdrew its petition and the action was dismissed.

Respondent seeks to have the present action dimissed on the grounds of <u>resjudicata</u>. Petitioner contends that Respondent has never established its title to the property and thus incorrectly assumes that it owns the seized property without having established the same by way of ruling. 9

The Court in Thomas v. Consolidated Coal Co., et al, 380 F.2d 69, 77(4th Cir.

<sup>8</sup>United States of America V. Woodrow Yokum, Fred L. Riggleman and Sherri L. Riggleman, Civil Action No. 76-0241-E(H), dismissed without prejudice (N.D. W.Va., March 22, 1979).

<sup>9</sup>Petitioner's memorandum in response to Respondent's motion to dismiss is quite convincing on this point. The memorandum, however, is not convincing on why determination of this issue is not barred by res judicata.

1967) cert. denied 389 U.S. 1004 and 1059 (1967), stated:

"Res Judicata is a broad, judicially developed doctrine under which the courts have sought to deal with the problems posed by the effects, if any, of a prior judgment on subsequent litigation."

The Court further stated:

\*Embraced within that rule are certain definite requirements which must be met before the rule will bar the subsequent suit. Briefly stated, these are: (1) The former judgment must have been both valid and final; (2) The cause of action asserted in the subsequent litigation must be the same cause of action as was asserted in the former litigation; (3) The former judgment must have been rendered on merits; and (4) The parties to the former judgment must stand in such relationship to the parties to the subsequent action as to entitle the latter to the benefits and subject them to the burdens of the prior litigation. [480 F.2d, at 79]"

The Court finds that the history of litigation by the present parties fulfills the requirements of Thomas. In Yokum v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 972, 529 F.2d 532 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 820

met as between the Thomas requirements are met as between the parties to the present action. Further, the decision in Woodrow Yokum v. United States of America and James Companion, etc., supra, precludes any cause of action concerning the seized property Petitioner could possibly bring against any other party. Also, any action for rent is precluded by the Fred L. Riggleman, et al v. United States, No. 3-75, Slip Op. at 2 (Ct. Cl., Sept. 29, 1977), action. Thus, Petitioner present action can in no way state a cause of action which cannot now be dismissed on the merits by the doctrine of res judicata.

Accordingly, this Court will grant Respondent's motion to dismiss with prejudice to any further claim as to the seized property which might be made by Petitioner.

The Clerk is directed to send a certified copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to all counsel of record.

ENTER: 2/12/81

By The Court Charles H. Haden II United States District Judge

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA ELKINS

WOODROW YOKUM,

Petitioner.

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 79-0130-E(H)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

### JUDGMENT ORDER

Pursuant to the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered this same day herein, the Court hereby ORDERS:

- That Respondent's motion to dismiss the present action is GRANTED.
- That the Clerk DISMISS the present action from the docket of this Court.

The Clerk is directed to send a certified copy of this Judgment Order to all counsel of record.

ENTER: 2/12/81

By The Court Charles H. Haden II United States District Judge

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 81 - 1299

WOODROW YOKUM

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Charles H. Haden II, District Judge

Argued February 1, 1982 Decided November 11, 1982

Before BRYAN, Senior Judge, WIDENER and HALL, Circuit Judges.

Richard W. Cardot for Appellant; Carmen M. Ortiz, Department of Justice (William A. Kolibash, United States Attorney, on brief) for Appellee.

#### PER CURIAM:

This appeal is the latest in a series of lawsuits filed by Woodrow Yokum seeking the return of personal property held by the United States Government. The

property in question was seized from Yokum's property pursuant to search warrants in 1967. Some of the property removed from Yokum's farm and transported to storage facilities while the remainder was padlocked in a barn on Yokum's farm and may still be there today. The property consisted rimarily of motor vehicles, military equipment and other items of personal property which the government alleged had been stolen from it. In 1968, Yokum was convicted of 10 counts of an eleven count indictment for interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2312, interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314, and unlawful sale of property stolen from the government, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. With the exception of one count, his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Yokum v. United States, 417 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 907 (1970).

In 1970, Yokum filed a motion for the return of the property seized in conjunction with a request for a reduction of his criminal sentence pursuant to FRCrP 41(e). That motion was denied without prejudice to Yokum's right to institute civil proceedings for the return of the property. 1

In 1973, Yokum filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking the return of the property or damages. That suit was dismissed as to the United States Attorney named as a defendant on the ground of quasi-judicial immunity and as to the government itself on the ground of sovereign immunity. Yokum v. United

<sup>1.</sup> Although the district court at Yokum's criminal trial could have decided the issue raised here, a civil action is also an appropriate alternative. See United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C.Cir.1970).

States, et al, No. 73-105-E (N.D.W.Va., September 13, 1974). Yokum did not appeal that order.

Next, Yokum filed suit in the United States Court of Claims in 1975 seeking the return of the property or damages in the The Court of Claims, alternative. mentioning only the damage claim, granted summary judgment to the government on the ground that the statute of limitations had The court concluded that Yokum's cause of action accrued at the time of the taking of the property, which in this case was 1967. The court then applied the six year statute of limitations applicable to actions filed in that court, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2501, and held that Yokum's claim was barred. Yokum unsuccessfully sought a rehearing. The Supreme Court denied Yokum v. United States, 529 certiorari. F. 2d 532 (C.Cl. 1975) (table), cert. den. 429 U. S. 820 (1976). Two other suits were filed in the Court of Claims by

Yokum's family, and both were dismissed. 2

Yokum then filed this action 1979 in the district court asking for the return of the property. The district court dismissed with prejudice on the ground that the suit was barred by res judicata, relying on Yokum v. United States, No. 2-75, 529 F.2d 532 (Ct.Cl 1975) (table). Yokum appeals, arguing that the issue of ownership of the property and its return has not previously been decided on the merits so that it was error for the district court to conclude that the action was barred by res judicata. In that regard, he contends that the Court of Claims' opinion could not be held to have decided the issue raised here since that court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief requested in this suit, return of the property, it being authorized to consider only claims for money.

Yokum is correct in his assertion that the Court of Claims may consider only

<sup>2.</sup> Wanda Yokum v. United States, No. 606-77 (Ct.Cl.Sept., 29, 1978), Fred L. Riggleman, et al v. United States, No. 3-75 (Ct.Cl.Sept. 29, 1977).

claims for money against the United States. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969). Even assuming, which we doubt, that he is correct in his construction of the doctrine of res judicata, that a ruling on the merits (as contrasted with some other aspect dispositive of the claim) of a precise claim is required for the doctrine to apply, there is no doubt at all that the Court of Claims decided that the statute of limitations of six years provided in 28 U.S.C. Sec 2501 had run on Yokum's claim for money damages for what he claimed was the wrongful detention of the property. That court decided that the statute began to run in 1967 when the property was seized by the government. Yokum is bound by that finding under the doctrine of res judicata, for the same issue, wrongful detention of the property, is presented here.

That aside, and assuming Yokum is not bound by the decision of the Court of Claims, an alternate reason for our decision, which cannot be avoided by the acknowledged facts in the record, is that the present suit of Yokum is barred by the

statute of limitations applying to suits against the United States in the district court. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(a) provides in pertinent part, "[e]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues." Even if we consider that the ruling of the Court of Claims, that the statute commenced to run in 1967, is not binding, the very latest the statute limitations can be held to commenced to run was in 1970 when Yokum filed his motion for "return of property" in the district court in the criminal case, United States v. Yokum, No. 67-91-E (N.D.W.Va. May 29, 1970). Because the latest date the statute of limitations commenced to run was in 1970, its running expired in 1976, so this action is time barred in all events under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401.

To Yokum's assertion that the defense of the statute of limitations was not raised in the district court, the answer is that the government cannot be

held to have waived the defense, and we must apply it here. Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887); Anderegg v. United States, 171 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949). Similarly, Yokum's assertion that the relief he seeks here is equitable and the statute of limitations should not apply is without merit. Suing for the return of the property is an action in the nature of replevin, a proceeding at law. Witherspoon v. Choctaw Culvert & Machinery Co., 56 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1932).

The judgment of the district court is accordingly

AFFIRMED.

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

WOODROW YOKUM,

Petitioner

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 79-130-E(H) UNITED STATE OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

### MOTION FOR ORDER TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY

Now comes the United States of America by William A. Kolibash, United States Attorney for the Northern District of West Virginia, and advises the Court that on November 11, 1982, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals entered judgement in Case \$81-1299 affirming this Court's decision to grant the Respondent United States' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice any further claim by Petitioner Yokum to property seized by the United States during the execution of search warrants in 1967, some of which is listed in detail in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order

entered on Pebruary 12, 1981. The united States further advises the Court that the Petitioner Yokum timely filed a petition for rehearing in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which was denied on December Under Rule 41 of the Federal 22. 1982. Rules of appellate Procedure, a mandate will issue seven days after the denial of the petition for rehearing. Accordingly, all appellate action has been concluded in the case, and the case has now returned to the jurisdiction of District Court. Therefore, the United States moves this Court for an Order permitting the united States Marshal to dispose of the seized property which is listed in this Court's Order of February accordance with 12. 1981. in the appropriate regulations of the United Marshal's Service. The United States States submits that its Motion should be granted in view of the opinion of this court and also the affirmance of that opinion by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The United States further submits that no hearing will be necessary on this Motion in view of the previous extensive litigation and the concluding opinion of this Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

/s/UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WILLIAM A. KOLIBASH
United States Attorney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

WOODROW YOKUM,

Petitioner,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 79-130-E(H)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY

Comes now the petitioner by his counsel, Richard W. Cardot, and advises the Court that the Petitioner would resist the motion for Order to dispose of porperty filed herein by the Respondent. Contrary to respondents assertions all appellant action has not been conlouded in the case. However, under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Appellate procedure a mandate shall automatically issue within seven (7) days and petitioner has moved the Fourth Circuit to stay the mandate. This was done on the 10th day of January, 1983, however, this was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on January 12, 1983. petitioner still desires and intends to file an appeal with the United States Court. Petitioner does not Supreme believe that time is of the essence that would require the immediate seizure of any properties since the properties have been stored there since 1967. Secondly, petitioner would oppose the Motion for Order to dispose of property in that the decision of the Fourth Circuit did reverse Judge Hadens decision as to res judicata the reason to terminate this litigation but instead found that statute of limitations had run against the petitioner. Petitioner would submit and is prepared to argue that if the statute of limitations has run against petitioner it has also run against the United States of America, the respondent, on its search warrants to recover these properties. And that the properties have for in all effect been abandoned by the United States of And ifthat the America, the respondent. statute of limitations has run against plaintiff it has thus run against the respondent.

The petitioner would oppose the entry of the order by the court without any opportunity of the petitioner to be heard on his position relating to the statute of limitations having run against the respondent, United States of America.

The petitioner would submit that a hearing will be necessary on the respondents motion and the petitioners opposition thereto.

WOODROW YOKUM
By Counsel

/S/

RICHARD W. CARDOT Attorney at Law P. O. Drawer 1729 Elkins, WV 26241 Counsel for Petitioner

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA ELKINS

WOODROW YOKUM,

Petitioner,

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 79-0130-E(H)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

### ORDER DIRECTING DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY

Presently pending before the Court is the Respondent's motion for order to dispose of property and the Petitioner's response opposing said motion.

The Court having maturely considered the Motion and response thereto and finding that the grounds for delay in disposition asserted by the Petitioner to be frivolous in law at this point in the litigation, and further believing a hearing on the matter not to be required and thus apprehending no just reason to delay the ultimate resolution of this case, therefore,

ORDERS that the United States Marshal, in accordance with appropriate

with United States Marshal Services's regulations, dispose of all property seized during the execution of federal search warrants in 1967 in the criminal prosecution of Petitioner Woodrow Yokum, said property being listed in part in this Court's previous Order of February 12, 1981. It is further

ORDERED that the United States Marshal's Office prepare and file with this Court a report of the results of the disposition of the subject property.

The Clerk is directed to mail a certified copy of this Order to counsel of record.

ENTER: February 4, 1983

By the Court Charles H. Haden II United States District Judge

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 81-1299

WOODROW YOKUM

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

ORDER

We have considered the petition for rehearing in this case and are of opinion it is without merit.

It is accordingly ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the petition for rehearing shall be, and it hereby is, denied.

Withe the concurrences of Judge Bryan and Judge Hall.

FOR THE COURT

Filed
December 22, 1982
U.S.Court of Appeals
Fourth Circuit

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of February, 1983, three (3) copies of Petitioner's Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The Fourth Circuit Court Of Appeals, was served upon counsel for Respondent by depositing said true copies in the United States Mail with sufficient postage attached thereto, addressed to counsel for Respondent at the following address:

William A. Kolibash United State Attorney P. O. Box 591 Wheeling, WV 26003

> RICHARD W. CARDOT Attorney at Law P. O. Drawer 1729 Elkins, WV 26241 Counsel for Petitioner